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By Hanoch Ben Pazi* 
Abstract 
This article aims to explore the philosophical meaning of pregnancy and maternity in the writ-
ings of R. Soloveitchik and Emmanuel Lévinas. They both make a phenomenological enquiry 
into these phenomena, by looking on the biological aspect and the emotional aspects. R. Solo ve-
itchik suggests a spiritual interpretation concerning the meaning of pregnancy, which is both 
biological and spiritual. He attempts to differentiate between the natural parenthood and the 
spiritual parenthood. Lévinas gives us the philosophical observation through the phenomenolog-
ical research of pregnancy, motherhood and parenthood. For him, this inquiry may be revealed 
as an ethical occurrence that demand responsibility. Perhaps this is one of the unique dimensions 
of modern Jewish philosophy, looking towards the religious texts with modern philosophic al 
method and modern philosophy theories. Reading carefully the biblical story of Genesis on the 
notion of birth and maternity, raises textual questions and cultural questions. For Lévinas and 
R. Soloveitchik these questions can open the door to new philosophical inquiry. 
The phenomenological school has sought to produce philosophical thought 
focused on life itself and on the concrete manner in which people experi-
ence their everyday reality. In this way, phenomenology has advanced new 
philosophical approaches facilitating religious and ethical discourse on sub-
jects that previously were not discussed in such a manner. This article offers 
a phenomenological inquiry into the ethical and educational significance of 
pregnancy and maternity in terms drawn from Jewish Talmudic discourse. 
This article talks about two Jewish philosophers of the twentieth century – 
Rabbi Joseph Dov Ber Soloveitchik (1903–1993), representative of Jewish 
existentialist thought, and Emmanuel Lévinas (1906–1995), representative 
of ethical thought based on phenomenology – and the ways in which they 
discuss the biological and ethical aspects of the phenomenon of pregnancy.1 
                                                 
*  Dr. Hanoch Ben Pazi, Dept. of  Philosophy, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, and 
Kibbutzim College of Education, Tel Aviv, Israel. 
1  For understandable reasons, we must distinguish between Lévinas’ use of phe-
nomenological philosophical inquiry as a student of Husserl and Heidegger, and 
the way in which Rabbi Soloveitchik, who started as an adherent of the neo-Kant-
ian school and, but turned to the existentialist thought, uses phenomenological 
analysis. As we will see below, the philosophical inquiry of both thinkers focus 
on concrete phenomena of life. Nevertheless, and this too will be emphasized 
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Despite the differences in the location of these two thinkers and the 
social contexts, in which they lived and worked, we nonetheless can identify 
a number of interesting similarities in their biographies.2 The lives of both 
men spanned almost the entire twentieth century, from its first decade 
through the middle of its last, and both immigrated from Eastern Europe 
to the West, R. Soloveitchik from Poland to Germany and then to the 
United States, Lévinas from Lithuania to France. Both also sustained a long-
time involvement in education, R. Soloveitchik at the Maimonides School 
in Boston and Lévinas at the Alliance Teachers Training School in Paris. R. 
Soloveitchik and Lévinas also made academic careers, the former at Yeshiva 
University and the latter at the University of Paris – Nanterre Campus (Paris 
X) and the Sorbonne Campus (Paris I, IV). And in a certain sense, both were 
also characterized by the formative status of their philosophical writing. 
More important to our discussion, however, are the common aspects of 
their thinking: their commitment to ethics and Judaism, their attempt to 
understand the importance of Judaism in their age through contemporary 
philosophical and cultural eyes, and their philosophical interpretation of 
Talmudic writings and Talmudic wisdom.3 Most interesting and curious 
                                                 
below, otherwise than Lévinas’, Soloveitchik’s approach to phenomenological 
discourse is neither precise nor stringent. This appears to stem primarily from 
Soloveitchik’s religious existential motivation, which enabled him to use differ-
ent philosophical tools in order to develop his religious philosophy.    
2  There are few important books and researches on Emmanuel Lévinas's biog-
raphy, e.g., MARIE ANNE LESCOURRET, Emmanuel Lévinas, Paris: Flammarion, 
1994 (²2005); SALOMON MALKA, Emmanuel Lévinas: la vie et la trace, Paris: Jean 
Claude Lettès, 2002 [English version: Emmanuel Levinas: His Life and Legacy, 
translated by Michael Kigel and Sonja M. Embree, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne 
University Press, 2006; German version: Emmanuel Levinas. Eine Biographie, aus 
dem Französischen von Frank Miething, München: C. H. Beck, 2004]; ADRI-
AAN THEODOOR PEPERZAK, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, Evans-
ton, Ill.: see,  tchik's lifeeiOn R. Solov –. 1997 Northwestern University Press, 
Love and Terror in the God Encounter: The Theological Legacy of  e.g., David Hartman,
RON HAA; 2001 Jewish Lights Pub., Woodstock, Vt.:Soloveitchik,  Rabbi Joseph B.
, Northvale, N.J. / Soloveitchik Halakhic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B., IEGLERZ
Memories of a Giant: (ed.),  IERMANB A.ICHAEL M; 1998 usalem: J. Aronson,Jer
ARON A, Jerusalem: Urim, 2013; Soloveitchik Reflections on Rabbi Dr Joseph B.
 Soloveitchik, , The Rav: The World of Rabbi Joseph B.OTHKOFFR-AKEFFETR
.  1999 House, Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav Pub.  
3  See, e.g., EPHRAIM MEIR, Lévinas's Jewish Thought: Between Jerusalem and Athens, 
Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2008; DANIELLE COHEN-LÉVINAS and SHMUEL TRI-
GANO (eds.), Emmanuel Lévinas: philosophie et judaïsme, Paris: In Press, 2002; 
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about their writing is the role of Talmudic, and perhaps Jewish Halakhic 
thought as a relevant interlocutor in the philosophical discourse of the pe-
riod. The interpretive philosophical tools, which they apply to Talmudic 
and Halakhic sources imbued them with, or helped them to derive from 
them, ethical philosophical thought.4 In the context of this article, which 
deals with the phenomenon of pregnancy and maternity, both R. Solovei-
tchik and Lévinas can be regarded as carrying out a phenomenological in-
vestigation of a distinctly feminine phenomenon and attempting to under-
stand the significance of this investigation and its implications beyond the 
realm of gender. For this reason, the consideration of the phenomenon of 
pregnancy in the writings of these two philosophers is surprising in light of 
the masculine image of religious writing and opens a new horizon for the 
gendered reading of Jewish sources.5 
It is important to note that both Soloveitchik and Lévinas engage in a 
variety of modes of writing: meditative, interpretative, Talmudic, Biblical, 
                                                 
CLAIRE ELISE KATZ, Lévinas, Judaism and the Feminine, Bloomington / Indianap-
olis, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2003  
4  See HANOCH BEN-PAZI, “Philosophers read the Talmud: The Reinterpretive 
Exegesis of Lévinas, R. Joseph Baer Soloveitchik and R. Abraham Isaac Kook 
– a Comparative Analysis", in: Judaica 67 (2011), pp. 3-40. 
5  On the topic of feminism and gender in Lévinas’ writings, see TINA CHANTER 
(ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Lévinas, University Park, PA: Penn State 
University Press, 2001; ROY MORNY, “Lévinas: Alterity, the Feminine and 
Women – A Meditation”, in: Studies in Religion 22 (1994), pp. 463-485; STELLA 
VILLARMEA, “The Provocation of Lévinas for Feminism”, in: European Journal 
of Women’s Studies 6 (1999), pp. 291-304; JÉRÔME BENARROCH, “Re-lecture tal-
mudique: à propos de la lecture talmudique d’Emmanuel Lévinas: ‘Et Dieu créa 
la femme’,”, in: Cahiers d’Études Lévinassiennes 6 (2007), pp. 163-185; CLAIRE 
ELISE KATZ, “From Eros to Maternity: Love, Death, and ‘the Feminine’ in the 
Philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas,” in: HAVA TIROSH-SAMUELSON (ed.), 
Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University 
Press, 2004, pp. 153-175 ; SUSANNAH HESCHEL, “Emmanuel Lévinas in Fem-
inistischer Perspektive,” in: Kirche und Israel 15 (2000), pp. 41-46; HANOCH 
BEN-PAZI, “Rebuilding the feminine in Lévinas’ Talmudic readings,” in: Journal 
of Jewish Thought & Philosophy 12/3 (2003), pp. 1-32. – On the question of femi-
nism in R. Soloveitchik’s thought, see SHIRA WOLOSKY WEISS, “The Lonely 
Woman of Faith,” in: Judaism 52 (2003), pp. 3-18; MAYER TWERSKY, “A 
Glimpse of the Rav,” in: Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 30 (1996), 
pp. 79-114; SIMCHA KRAUSS, “The Rav: On Zionism, Universalism and Femi-
nism,” in: Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 34 (2000), pp. 24-39; 
CHANA KEHAT, “Partnership and Equality: Between Rav Kook and Rabbi 
Soloveitchik,” in: Massekhet 4 (2006), pp. 35-48 (Hebrew). 
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philosophical, and homiletical. At times, it may appear to readers that they 
must distinguish carefully between the different modes of writing, and many 
scholars espouse an approach that does just that. However, the logic under-
lying the scholarly approach employed in this article strives to forge a pri-
marily interpretative philosophical connection between the modes of writ-
ing. Thus, writing that can be understood as anecdotal – such as a comment 
appearing in an interpretative text on the Bible or a paragraph discussed in 
a Halakhic or Talmudic text – may actually play a role in a systematic posi-
tion regarding a specific subject – in our case, the subject of pregnancy and 
maternity. 
Contemporary readers may be surprised by the little or no direct men-
tion of the phenomenon of pregnancy in philosophical literature up to the 
mid-twentieth century. The phenomenological school, which devoted in-
depth inquiries into everyday phenomena and issues (such as those of Ed-
mund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Albert Camus, and Jean-Paul Sartre) as-
cribed little significance to this central everyday human event.6 Paradoxi-
cally, even Simon de Beauvoir, whose work The Second Sex deals with the 
centrality of pregnancy in the definition of the female subject as female, 
identifies it not as an ethical phenomenon but rather in a biological context, 
and as a weakening factor among the elements of the subject’s identity.7 
                                                 
6  See MARYLOU SENA, “The Tragic Voice of the Feminine and its Significance 
for Phenomenology,” in: PHILIP BLOSSER (ed.), Japanese and Western Phenomenol-
ogy, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, pp. 181-192; LINDA 
FISHER, “Feminist Phenomenological Voices,” in: Continental Philosophy Review 
43 (2010), pp. 83-95. – An interesting effort to develop such a phenomenolog-
ical discussion can nonetheless be found in a number of feminist works, such 
as SHANNON VALLOR, “The Pregnancy of the Real: A Phenomenological De-
fense of Experimental Realism,” in: Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philoso-
phy 52 (2009), pp. 1-25, which was written in response to a different discussion 
but contains fascinating phenomenological elements following Husserl. See 
also LOUISE LEVESQUE-LOPMAN, “Listen, and You Will Hear: Reflections on 
Interviewing from a Feminist Phenomenological Perspective,” in: LINDA 
FISHER (ed), Feminist Phenomenology, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, 2000, pp. 103-132; JANET DONOHOE, “The Vocation of Motherhood: 
Husserl and Feminist Ethics,” in: Continental Philosophy Review 43 (2010), 
pp. 127-140. An interesting attempt to propose initial lines of thinking on preg-
nancy from a Heidegerrian perspective can be found in LANEI M. ROSENMEY-
ER's article “Dasein Gets Pregnant,” in: Philosophy Today 42 (1998), pp. 76-84. 
7  SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, Le deuxieme sexe, Paris: Gallimard, 1949. On de Beau-
voir’s philosophy and this notion, see MARGARET A. SIMONS (ed.), The Philoso-
phy of Simone de Beauvoir: Critical Essays, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University 
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The mode of discussion began to change with the publication and influence 
of Sara Ruddick’s works on maternity8 and Carol Gilligan’s works on ethical 
aspects of the distinction between masculine and feminine. This distinction 
between different voices of ethical judgement reflected a breakthrough in 
thinking on gender, and, despite the significant criticism that has been writ-
ten on books and studies on this subject, there is no question regarding the 
major impact of their efforts.9 Sara Ruddick pays considerable attention not 
only to the phenomenon itself but to what she refers to as “maternal think-
ing,” oriented toward the Other and others, and offers an in-depth exami-
nation of the connection between the private sphere and the public sphere. 
Maternal thinking deals with issues of power and powerlessness, and facili-
tates the introduction to the public sphere of a position of protected life 
and a pacifistic dimension.10 
                                                 
Press, 2006; KATE KIRKPATRICK, “Past Her Prime? Simone de Beauvoir on 
Motherhood and Old Age,” in: Sophia: International Journal for Philosophy of Reli-
gion, Metaphysical Theology and Ethics 53 (2014), pp. 275-287; JANET FARRELL 
SMITH, “Possessive Power,” in: Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 1 (1986), 
pp. 103-120. See also ULRIKA BJÖRK's critical article, “Paradoxes of Femininity 
in the Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir,” in: Continental Philosophy Review 
43 (2010), pp. 39-60; YOLANDA A. PATTERSON, Simon de Beauvoir and the Demys-
tification of Motherhood, Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1989; BARBARA 
DUDEN, Disembodying Women: Perspectives on Pregnancy and the Unborn, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.    
8  Ruddick posits that the practicalities of maternity lead the mother to relinquish 
part of her power for the benefit of her children. See SARA RUDDICK, Maternal 
Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1989; TONI BOW-
ERS, The Politics of Motherhood: British Writing and Culture, 1680-1760, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996; NANCY J. CHODOROW, The Reproduction of 
Mothering, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978; JOYCE TREBLICOT 
(ed.), Mothering: Essays in Feminist Theory, Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1983. 
9  See CAROL GILLIGAN, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Devel-
opment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982, and CAROL GILLI-
GAN, Mapping the Moral Domain: A Contribution of Women’s Thinking to Psychological 
Theory and Education, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1989. See also 
CAROL LEGET, CHRIS GASTMANS, and MARIAN VERKERK (eds.), Care, Compas-
sion and Recognition: An Ethical Discussion, Leuven: Peeters Publishers 2011.  
10  A recently published collection of articles dedicated to Sara Ruddick contains 
important discussions on pregnancy from a feminist philosophical perspective. 
See SHEILA LINTOTT and MAUREEN SANDER-STAUDT (eds.), Philosophical In-
quiries into Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Mothering: Maternal Subjects, New York / Lon-
don: Routledge, 2012. 
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Late twentieth-century feminist writing’s attention to and deep under-
standing of the subject may stem also from the influence of psychoanalytical 
theoretical writing.11 One example that highlights this absence can be found 
in Isabelle Mercier’s article “The Origins of Consciousness.” “What is this 
relationship that a mother has to her foetus?” asks Mercier: 
A pregnant woman can feel a range of emotions directed towards this foetus 
that is growing inside of her. They can range from apprehension, love, antici-
pation, nervousness and even indifference (denial) and hatred. However, emo-
tions do not describe the ontological significance of being pregnant. In what 
follows I will speculate by trying to piece together a possible Sartrian perspec-
tive of pregnancy. As I have mentioned before, I can only speculate because 
Sartre offers little or no discussion of the subject. However, I am confident that 
Being and Nothingness allows us to extend Sartre’s ontology.12 
On this basis, the very discussion of pregnancy, maternity, and parenthood 
by R. Soloveitchik and Lévinas warrants philosophical consideration. Both 
approach the issue from the perspective of ethics and the question of bio-
logical and non-biological parental responsibility, and both are somewhat 
committed to the portrayal of pregnancy presented by Martin Buber in I and 
Thou, and in the context of dialogical thinking.13 Both also attempt to rein-
terpret the significance of pregnancy in the Bible and the Mishnaic and Tal-
mudic commentary and regard the biological dimension as only one aspect 
of the phenomenon. 
                                                 
11  See SHEILA LINTOTT (ed.), Motherhood – Philosophy for Everyone: The Birth of Wis-
dom, London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010; ADRIENNE RICH, Of Woman Born: Mother-
hood as Experience and Institution, New York: Norton, 1976; IRIS MARION 
YOUNG, On Female Body Experience: ‘Throwing Like a Girl’ and Other Essays, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005; SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, The Dialectic of 
Sex: The Case For Feminist Revolution, New York: Morrow, 1970; BARBARA ROTH-
MAN, The Tentative Pregnancy: How Amniocentesis Changes the Experience of Mother-
hood, New York: Norton, 1993; EVA FEDER KITTAY and ELLEN FEDER (eds.), 
The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency, Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2003.  
12  ISABELLE MERCIER, “The Origins of Consciousness: a Look into the Foetus 
and the Pregnant Body in ‘Being and Nothingness’,” in: Gnosis: Journal of Philos-
ophy 5 (2001), ISSN 1927-5277 Gnosis online: URL https://ojs.concor-
dia.ca/index.php/gnosis/article/view/144. 
13  Although Buber does not discuss pregnancy as a philosophical concept, I and 
Thou contains a dialogical account of pregnancy and advances it as a model of 
the relationship between the I and the Other. See: MARTIN BUBER, “I and 
Thou,” in: WILL HERBERGER (ed.), The Writings of Martin Buber, New York: New 
American Library, 1956, pp. 50-54. 
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R. Soloveitchik proposes an interpretation that is both biological and 
spiritual in nature and attempts to differentiate between natural parenthood 
and spiritual parenthood.14 In Lévinas’ phenomenological analyses of preg-
nancy, motherhood, and parenthood, pregnancy emerges first and foremost 
as an ethical phenomenon, revealing a deep ethical substructure of the other 
and otherness.15 The very attempt to read religious sources from a perspec-
tive of philosophical thought is not unique to the modern Jewish philoso-
phy, and we can find it in other traditions do this as well. Nonetheless, we 
note the intellectual openness that characterizes them and the manner in 
which they discuss these subjects.16 
From a methodological perspective, the reading of R. Soloveitchik pro-
posed in this article is based on the phenomenology of Lévinas. Whereas 
Lévinas regards the biological phenomenon as the basis of the ethical im-
perative, R. Soloveitchik feels that a religious interpretation is needed to 
give ethical meaning to the same biological phenomenon.17 Can ethical 
                                                 
14  Although no methodological research has thus far been undertaken on phe-
nomenology in Soloveitchik’s thinking, a few specific phenomenological stud-
ies have been published. Examples include: GERALD JACOB BLIDSTEIN, “On 
the Halakhic Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik: The Norms and Nature 
of Mourning,” in: Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 30/4 (1996), pp. 
115-130; GERALD JACOB BLIDSTEIN, “Death in the Writings of R. Joseph Dov 
Soloveitchik,” in: Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 44/1 (2010), pp. 
7-18; LAWRENCE J. KAPLAN, “Joseph Soloveitchik and Halakhic Man,” in: MI-
CHAEL L. MORGAN and PETER ELI GORDON (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Modern Jewish Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 209-
233; DOV SCHWARTZ, “Uvikashtem Misham: Rabbi J.B. Soloveitchik’s Response 
to the Phenomenology of Religion,” in: BENJAMIN ISH SHALOM (ed.), Paths of 
Peace: Studies in Jewish Philosophy, Dedicated to Shalom Rosenberg, Jerusalem: Beit Mo-
rasha, 2007, pp. 447-458 (Hebrew); RIVKA HOROWITZ, “Rav Soloveitchik’s At-
titude toward the Religious Experience and to Mysticism,” in: HAVIVA PEDAYA 
and EPHRAIM MEIR (eds.), The Many Faces of Judaism: Literature and Philosophy, 
Be’er Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2002, pp. 205-235 (Hebrew). 
15  A large number of scholars have explored these aspects of Lévinas’ thinking. 
See, e.g., KATZ, “From Eros to Maternity” (note 5).  
16  Here, I would like to draw readers’ attention to Blidstein’s article on the unique 
manner, within the rabbinical landscape of which he is part, in which Rabbi 
Soloveitchik addresses issues related to romantic relationships, sexuality, and 
paternity, see: GERALD J. (YA’AKOV) BLIDSTEIN, “The Covenant of Marriage,” 
in: GERALD J. (YA’AKOV) BLIDSTEIN, Society and Self: On the Writings of Rabbi 
Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 2012. 
17  On the existential observations in Soloveitchik's writings, see OLIVER LEAMAN, 
“Jewish Existentialism: Rosenzweig, Buber, and Soloveitchik,” in: DANIEL 
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meaning be assigned to biological and natural life? How can we understand 
animal events as spiritual and as the subject of ethical deliberation? Woman 
as a pregnant human being is engaged in natural behaviour. At the same 
time, she also can be thought of as a partner of the Divine Creator; but does 
this constitute a spiritual aspect of creation? 
In the Beginning: Masculine Writing on Pregnancy and Childbirth 
The masculine attributes of Biblical and Talmudic writing are well known 
and frequently subjected to harsh criticism and, in some cases, downright 
condemnation. This may be the most formidable challenge with which both 
R. Soloveitchik and Lévinas are required to contend in their approach to 
the subjects of pregnancy and childbirth. I wish to consider this aspect of 
the Jewish homiletical writing on the Book of Genesis as seen through R. 
Soloveitchik’s rabbinical eyes. One of the most vexing aspects of the male 
Biblical mode of writing in the Book of Genesis pertains to its chronological 
lists (תודלות), or its human genealogy. The historical genealogies presented 
in the Book of Genesis are almost all male, relating almost exclusively to 
the birth of sons and the sons of sons and characteristically failing to men-
tion the names of mothers. The result is a continuous list of males who 
fathered sons.18 
The Hebrew word תודלות means “chronology,” “chronicle,” or “his-
tory,” but in the biblical narrative, genealogical lists were intended to repre-
sent the history of humanity. The Hebrew noun תודלות is derived from the 
root י-ל-ד , which means “to give birth”, or in its causative form דילוה “to 
beget”. Thus, e.g., “And Noah begot [דלויו] three sons: Shem, Ham, and 
Jafet” (Gen. 6:10), and “Terah begot [דילוה] Abram, Nahor and Haran; and 
Haran begot Lot” (Gen. 11:27). In this way, according to the book of 
                                                 
H. FRANK and OLIVER LEAMAN (eds.), History of Jewish Philosophy (Routledge 
History of World Philosophies, vol. II), London / New York: Routledge; 2003, 
pp. 799-819;  MICHAEL S. BERGER, “’Uvikashtem mi-sham’: Rabbi Joseph B. Solo-
veitchik’s Response to Martin Buber’s Religious Existentialism,” in: Modern Juda-
ism 18 (1998), pp. 93-118; MARK ANGEL, “Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik: Juda-
ism and Modernity,” in: Conversations 21 (2015), pp. 102-115; GERALD J. BLID-
STEIN, “Death in the Writings of R. Joseph Dov Soloveitchik,” in: Tradition: 
A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 44 (2010), pp. 7-18.  
18  See, e.g., the genealogical lists in Genesis 5:1-32 and Genesis 11:10-32, which 
can be contrasted to lists that do pay attention to the gendered aspects of births, 
such as those that convey the line of Cain (Gen. 4:17-22) and the line of Nahor 
and Milka (Gen. 22:20-24).    
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Genesis the act of begetting to give birth to new generations is a male act, 
by which grandfathers produce fathers, fathers produce sons, and sons pro-
duce grandsons, etc. Indeed, when the verb “to give birth” is used in a fe-
male form, it occurs always in the context of a single act or personal event. 
Women give birth to an individual, but the genealogical lists are masculine. 
R.  Soloveitchik inquires the use of this Hebrew root in the context of 
the birth of Isaac in the opening verse of the portion תודלות – “This is the 
story of Isaac, son of Abraham; Abraham begot [דילוה] Isaac” (Gen. 25:19) 
– which employs the causative form of י-ל-ד  that is clearly associated with 
the word for giving birth. What is the meaning of this verse, R. Soloveitchik 
asks? Is it a response to a gossip, as the Midrash suggests – a clear response 
to those who wondered aloud whether Abraham was indeed the new-born’s 
father?19 R. Soloveitchik’s response, however, shifts the focus from biolog-
ical and historical observation to a religious and spiritual perspective. 
Let us consider the first biblical account of birth and check whether this 
account can be read as an articulation of the religious perspective of the phe-
nomenon. The Book of Genesis describes the creation of human beings as 
the creation of man, as R. Soloveitchik interprets it.20 The first man was born 
not through birth in the natural sense but through spiritual birth, through 
divine word and deed. The biblical account of natural pregnancy and birth is 
preceded by another, perhaps alternative story, containing religious observa-
tions on the creation of human beings.21 In the book of Genesis, the first case 
of pregnancy and birth discussed is not that of Eve but the coming into ex-
istence of Adam, the first man, who is depicted as a complete human being, 
                                                 
19  See Rashi on Genesis 19 and 25 and the way R. Soloveitchik interprets it in 
his “Parenthood: Natural and Redeemed,” in: JOSEPH DOV SOLOVEITCHIK, 
Family Redeemed: Essays on Family Relationships, ed. by DAVID SCHATZ and JOEL 
B. WOLOWELSKY, Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav Publishing House, 2000, pp. 105-125, 
esp. pp. 105-106. 
20  See JOSEPH DOV SOLOVEITCHIK, “Adam and Eve”, in: SOLOVEITCHIK Family 
Redeemed (note 19), pp. 3-30, esp. pp. 3-18. R. Soloveitchik differentiates be-
tween Man-natura and Man-persona, between the description of human being 
as part of nature, and human being as personality.  
21  For feminist critiques of the masculine and patriarchal construct of these chap-
ters of creation in Genesis, see KATE MILLET, Sexual Politics, Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1969, pp. 70-75; MIEKE BAL, Lethal Love: Feminist Literary Interpreta-
tions of Biblical Love Stories, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1987, 
pp. 118-127. Also see KARI ELISABETH BORRESEN (ed.), Image of God and Gender 
Models: in Judaeo-Christian Tradition, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press, 1991. 
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including an element of serving as the basis for a new person. In the biblical 
text, the event is described as follows: a man (thus far, the only man in exist-
ence) goes to sleep, and “the LORD God casts a deep sleep upon the man; 
and, while he slept, He took one of his ribs and closed up the flesh at that 
spot” (Gen. 2:21), and so on. When we try to imagine the scene, what comes 
to the mind strikingly resembles a Caesarean section. Perhaps, that way, the 
book of Genesis is attempting to convey the message that before the first 
woman became pregnant and gave birth, the act of giving birth was associated 
with man and understood as an expression of man’s ability and masculine 
power; feminine pregnancy is regarded as some kind of punishment. Indeed, 
according to Gen. 3:16 God is telling Eve: “I will greatly multiply thy pain. In 
sorrow thou shalt bring forth children […].” Can we suggest that the Biblical 
description of pregnancy gave preference to the religious meaning of preg-
nancy overs its biological significance? This study will explore this Biblical 
question from a phenomenological perspective. 
The intuitive feeling that the religious text is masculine in character is 
well founded with regard to the Biblical literature in general and the Book 
of Genesis in particular.22 Lévinas’ and R. Soloveitchik’s efforts in them-
selves encompass an essay to contend with the nature of masculine biblical 
writing and the possibility of thinking differently about pregnancy and 
parenthood within the religious philosophical context. In a certain sense, 
both thinkers are called upon, each to a lesser or greater extent, to address 
the initial stories of the book of Genesis and the gender distinctions they 
reflect. 
Lévinas’ Phenomenological Inquiry: The Uniqueness of Pregnancy and its Ethi-
cal Implications 
The understanding of the importance and uniqueness of the phenomenon 
of pregnancy which I wish to advance here is based on Lévinas’ phenome-
nological discourse, which offers an analysis of pregnancy and a number of 
other related phenomena that are worthy of investigation, such as Eros, 
                                                 
22  On this controversy regarding biblical language, see: DONALD A. CARSON, The 
Inclusive-Language Debate: A Plea for Realism, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 
1998; MARK L. STRAUSS, Distorting Scripture? The Challenge of Bible Translation 
and Gender Accuracy, Downers Grove, IL: Inter Varsity Press, 1998; VERN 
S. POYTHRESS and WAYNE A. GRUDEM, The Gender-Neutral Bible Controversy: 
Muting the Masculinity of God’s Words, Nashville, MA: Broadman & Holman, 2000. 
See also ATHALYA BRENNER-IDAN (ed.), A Feminist Companion to Genesis, Shef-
field: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998. 
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parenthood and childhood, and dwelling. For Lévinas, all of these phenom-
ena are subjects of inquiry due to the questions they raise concerning the 
relationship between the subject and the Other.23 
Lévinas is known in the philosophical field for his development of ethical 
thought regarding the Other and the alterity of the Other. Lévinas’ phenom-
enological study devotes substantial attention to man’s encounter with the 
Other and to the manner in which the subject views the face of the Other 
gazing upon him. Lévinas’ major work Totality and Infinity is devoted to the 
strict phenomenological study of the manner in which the subject encounters 
the Other and the face of the Other, which gazes upon him and commands 
him: “thou shalt not kill.”24 The point of departure of Lévinas’ inquiry is the 
ethical imperative with which the subject is charged to refrain from harming 
the alterity of the Other, and therefore also to respect his place and his 
uniqueness. However, Lévinas also assigns positive importance to the ethical 
imperative: the responsibility with which the subject is charged. In a particu-
larly demanding manner, Lévinas presents the encounter with the Other as 
an interaction that charges the subject with responsibility for the Other’s ex-
istence and needs. In this sense, Lévinas’ approach to the examination of and 
inquiry into the phenomenon of pregnancy is unique in its complete trans-
formation of the question of interiority and exteriority. During pregnancy, 
can the Other be considered internal to the subject? If so, can pregnancy best 
be thought of as the ultimate expression of hospitality? And what will be the 
significance of this hospitality? This phenomenon, which appears to be natu-
ral and to go without saying on the surface, is actually extremely challenging 
from an ethical perspective. Equally as important, however, is Lévinas’ effort 
to learn from this biological phenomenon about the all-encompassing and 
complete nature of parental responsibility and the completeness of the sub-
ject’s responsibility toward the Other within him. 
                                                 
23  A large number of scholars have explored these aspects of Lévinas's writing. 
See, e.g., KATZ, “From Eros to Maternity” (note 5); JENNIFER ROSATO, 
“Woman as Vulnerable Self: The Trope of Maternity in Lévinas's 'Otherwise 
Than Being',” in: Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 27 (2012), pp. 348-365. 
For important work comparable to the research proposed here but with regard 
to Derrida, see NANCY J. HOLLAND’s Feminist Interpretations of Jacques Derrida, 
University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997, and her short paper 
“’With Arms Wide Open’: Of Hospitality and the Most Intimate Stranger,” in: 
Philosophy Today 45 (2001), pp. 133-137.  
24  See EMMANUEL LÉVINAS, Totality and Infinity, translated by Alphonso Lingis, 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969, pp. 152-174, 256-273: 
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To understand the uniqueness of pregnancy as an ethical phenomenon, 
we must first consider its uniqueness among the different possible expres-
sions of a person’s humanity. In the course of pregnancy, the relationship 
between the subject and the Other – between the mother and the foetus – 
is based not on separation and a sense of foreignness but on identification 
and responsibility. During pregnancy, the Other is at once part of the 
mother and separate from her. 
To emphasize the unique significance of pregnancy, we can consider the 
manner in which Maimonides chooses to describe the phenomenon, as a situ-
ation that flies in the face of common sense. Maimonides refers to pregnancy 
when trying to illustrate the impossible undertaking of understanding creation. 
In this context, he suggests imagining an orphan who grew up on a deserted 
island and who, in one way or another, discovers the fact of pregnancy – the 
existence of one person inside another person: “Now the orphaned child must 
of necessity put the question: Does every individual amongst us – when little, 
contained within a belly, but alive and moving and growing – eat, drink, breathe 
through the mouth and nose, and produce excrements?”25 
From a philosophical perspective, pregnancy is not simply a biological 
state but also an ethical situation. We may, of course, consider the ethical 
questions with which many women are faced during pregnancy.26 However, 
pregnancy can also be viewed as a phenomenological situation that is, in 
itself, an ethical situation by nature. It is a state in which one person holds 
within herself the Other, which is at once both part of her and entirely sep-
arate from her. Bodies typically respond to penetrating foreign object by 
rejecting them, but not in the case of pregnancy; during pregnancy, the body 
protects and sustains the stranger within.27 
                                                 
25  MOSES MAIMONIDES, The Guide of the Perplexed, translated by Shlomo Pines, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963, II,17, pp. 295-296. 
26  On the issue of responsibility and the distinction between desired pregnancy and 
undesired pregnancy, see, e.g., CAROLINE LUNDQUIST, “Being Torn: Toward a 
Phenomenology of Unwanted Pregnancy,” in: Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philos-
ophy 23/3 (2008), pp. 136-155; MARIA SALETE BESSA JORGE, GETÚLIO VASCON-
CELOS FIÚZA, and MARIA VERACI OLIVEIRA QUEIROZ, “Existential Phenome-
nology as a Possibility to Understand Pregnancy Experiences in Teenagers,” in: 
Revista Latino-Americana de Enfermagem 14 (2006), pp. 907-914. This fascinating ar-
ticle tries to apply the implications of the phenomenological discussion in an ap-
plied context to the issue of nursing in complex cases of adolescent pregnancies. 
In this study, adolescent girls were asked what it means for them to be pregnant 
and to contend with the natural and unnatural aspects of this human situation.  
27  See FREDRIKA SCARTH, HILDE LINDEMANN, and SARA RUDDICK (eds.), The 
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The subject typically relates to the Other using his or her senses and by 
means of the manner in which his or her body encounters the body of the 
Other and the messages it conveys. In his phenomenological inquiry (the 
“Fifth Meditation”), Husserl considers the possibility of identifying a living 
body beyond oneself as another person. Consciousness of one's own body 
can be established by integrating the various senses. But the body of the 
other exists always as an object, whereas phenomenological inquiry, as a 
rule, considers the thoughts of the Other not as an object but as a subject: 
“It is clear from the very beginning,” writes Husserl, “that only a similarity 
connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my 
body can serve as the motivational basis for the ‘analogizing’ apprehension of 
that body as another animate organism.”28 
For Lévinas, to think about pregnancy is to change the meaning of the 
subject, its relation to the Other, and the way of exploring the Other.29 The 
phenomenon of pregnancy is a different mode of “one and the other,” 
based neither on analogizing nor meeting “face-to-face,” but rather on re-
sponsibility. According to Lévinas, Husserl does not consider the woman 
as a subject and therefore does not regard the phenomenon of pregnancy 
as subject to phenomenological inquiry. These ideas are developed in three 
of Lévinas’ major philosophical works.30 
Lévinas’ inquiry into the phenomenon of pregnancy attends not only to 
biological structure but also to the more challenging aspects of pregnancy.31 
For Lévinas, pregnancy is a state in which one human being is pursued by 
another one for whom the first is responsible. During pregnancy, the woman 
                                                 
Other Within: Ethics, Politics, and the Body in Simone de Beauvoir, Lanham, MD: Row-
man & Littlefield, 2004. 
28  EDMOND HUSSERL, Cartesian Meditations, translated by D. Cairns, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, p. 111. 
29  See Catherine Chalier’s critique of Levina’s attitude to the feminine in: CATHE-
RINE CHALIER, Figures du féminin: lecture d’Emmanuel Levinas (coll. « Questions », 
no. 198), Paris: éd. La Nuit surveillée, 1982 [Paris: éd. Des Femmes-Antoinette 
Fouque, ²2007], pp. 46-51, especially the study of the use of language relating 
to the feminine. 
30  See EMMANUEL LÉVINAS, Time and the Other, translated by Richard A. Cohen, 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987, pp. 84-94; LÉVINAS, Totality and 
Infinity (note 24), pp. 152-174, 274-280; EMMANUEL LÉVINAS, Otherwise than Be-
ing or Beyond Essence, translated by Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne Uni-
versity Press, 1981, pp. 99-129.  
31  On the ethical significance of the biological phenomenon, see LÉVINAS, Other-
wise than Being (note 30), pp. 114-117.  
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finds herself burdened with a new mode of responsibility: responsibility that 
is corporeal and complete and encompasses suffering, pain, and the element 
of the unknown. That pained sigh – the inner suffering that expresses abso-
lute responsibility toward something that is other than oneself – is a distinctly 
ethical characteristic that moves beyond itself, from pregnancy into the con-
cept of maternity. As a source of the image of “being responsible for one by 
whom you are being pursued,” Lévinas draws on the Talmudic discussion 
regarding one person’s pursuit of another with malicious intent. Indeed, situ-
ations may arise in which the foetus proves harmful to the health or survival 
of the mother.32 
Lévinas does not limit himself to an account of this uniqueness of the 
phenomenon and addresses what he regards as a still sensitive nerve of the 
subjectivity of the subject (The Passivity of Passivity). According to Lévi-
nas’ description, pregnancy also encompasses a subversive aspect that un-
dermines the stable foundations of the subject.33 An observation of 
parenthood, or, more precisely, the profound experience of pregnancy and 
childbirth, reflects an element of injury to the certainty of the subject, stem-
ming from the knowledge of the subject’s having been “born,” that is to 
say, having been preceded by an Other. As a result, the once possible de-
scription of the “I” as certain, in encountering his environment and others 
and seeking to understand and investigate their existence and his relation-
ship with them, is now completely undermined by the I’s discovery that he 
was preceded by an Other and that his subjectivity was preceded by the 
subjectivity of the Other. Can we say that the meaning of “subjectivity” 
changes as a result of this phenomenology? Apparently, we can, as de-
scribed by Lévinas in a manner that goes beyond memory and beyond the 
certainty of the I, as a reminder to the immemorial memory of the Self.34 
                                                 
32  This Halakhic question is discussed in the rabbinical literature. See, e.g., bSanh 
73a-b (on mSanh VIII,7); mOhol VII,4-6. 
33  The subject's transformation is discussed a number of times throughout the book. 
34  On the importance of the “immemorial,” see JOHN H. RIKER, “Self-Psychology 
and the Problem of the Other,” in: International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self Psy-
chology 7 (2012), pp. 165-179; SUZANNE BARNARD, “The Corporeal and the 
Sublime in Feminine Depression: Kristeva's Semiotic and Das Ding,” in: Gender 
and Psychoanalysis 4 (1999), pp. 367-386; BETTY BERNARDO FUKS, “Vocation of 
Exile: Psychoanalysis and Judaismm,” in: International Forum of Psychoanalysis 8 
(1999), pp. 7-12; JEFFREY ANDREW BARASH, “Memory and the Immemorial in 
the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas,” in: Sofia Philosophical Review 3 (2009), 
pp. 5-16 ;  
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Here, Lévinas appears to be referring to the I’s difficulty assuming itself 
as a certainty and as a basis for consciousness, and to the role of pregnancy 
as a reminder to the individual of his or her having been born. After all, he 
who is born cannot constitute a source of certainty or of primacy. A born 
being cannot be a basis for full consciousness or one who establishes a 
world. “Maternity,” explains Lévinas, “in the complete being ‘for the other’ 
which characterizes it […] is the ultimate sense of this vulnerability."35 
Maternity and Parenthood, then, emerge as surprising and fascinating 
phenomena comprising all the necessary dimensions of being for an Other. 
Pregnancy attains significance by making possible a meaning other than the 
subject; indeed, it receives its identity not by virtue of being for itself but by 
virtue of being for an Other. 
Here, we refrain from delving into the manner in which Lévinas devel-
ops these ideas and the evolution that takes place in his inquiries, from Time 
and the Other, in which he first discusses the unique role of parenthood in 
understanding the concept of the subject and ethics vis-à-vis the Other and 
others; to Totality and Infinity, in which the discussion of parenthood reflects 
development of the concept of the feminine; to the meaning of “dwelling” 
and concepts of “hospitality” and responsibility toward the Other;36 
through the stage in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, to which we pay 
considerable attention here, in which Lévinas takes yet another courageous 
intellectual and ethical step forward not only in understanding the phenom-
enon itself but in undermining the revealed subject. The phenomenology 
of pregnancy has ethical implications–which transcend the biological phe-
nomenon–for the concepts of maternity and parenthood and for a deeper 
understanding of the notion of responsibility toward the Other, even at the 
price of doing injury to the subjectivity of the I, to the point of the I’s guar-
anteeing and taking the place of the Other.37 
                                                 
35  LÉVINAS, Otherwise than Being (note 30), p. 108. 
36  See IRINA ARISTARKHOVA, “Hospitality and the Maternal,” in: Hypatia: A Journal 
of Feminist Philosophy 27 (2012), pp. 163-181; ABI DOUKHAN, “From Exile 
to Hospitality: A Key to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas,” in: Philosophy 
Today 54 (2010), pp. 235-246; RAYMOND D. BOISVERT, “Ethics Is Hospital-
ity,” in: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78 (2004), 
pp. 289-300. 
37  Lévinas addresses the concept of hospitality on a number of levels. The first 
instance, which opens the door to this notion, is found in his Totality and Infinity 
(note 24), pp. 154-162.  
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R. Soloveitchik on Pregnancy and Motherhood 
It is important to emphasize that although both thinkers use terms taken 
from phenomenological discourse, they imbue these terms with different 
meanings: Rabbi Soloveitchik, whose Berlinian philosophical education is 
rooted in neo-Kantian thought and who was well versed in the early twen-
tieth century study of religion, as opposed to Lévinas, whose approach is 
deeply rooted in the phenomenological school, which he uses to consider 
the sources of religion. 
R. Soloveitchik's doctrine is typically classified first and foremost as ex-
istential religious doctrine. Although his observation of human phenomena 
is directly related to European existential discourse, he examines this dis-
course within a Jewish religious context and makes use of religious dis-
course to understand it against the background of existential thought. 
R. Soloveitchik's awareness of the early twentieth century inquiry into reli-
gion enables him to engage in religious phenomenological examination of 
subjects, ideas, and laws from the Jewish world.38 His thinking and 
knowledge regarding the world of philosophy affords R. Soloveitchik a cre-
ative and particularly challenging reading of Jewish halakhic and philosoph-
ical discourse, in his examination of fundamental concepts such as faith, 
Jewish law (halakha), prayer, and community. R. Soloveitchik's gaze, then, 
is focused on the subject bearing the faith and the law, as reflected in a 
number of his works that contain the word "man" in their title, such as The 
Lonely Man of Faith and Halakhic Man, and a number of essays of which this 
is their primary focus, such as םשמ םתשקיבו (u-viqqaštem mi-šam) (“And From 
There You Shall Seek”).39 In this context, we can understand how 
R. Soloveitchik also engages in a discussion of intra-couple relations and 
parenthood. Nonetheless, his approach to reading and examining these sub-
jects is unique and bold, and enables us to extract from his writings his 
views on the subject of pregnancy.40 
                                                 
38  ZVI KOLITZ, Confrontation: The Existential Thought of Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik, Ho-
boken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1992; DOV SCHWARTZ, From Phenomenology 
to Existentialism: The Philosophy of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, vol. II, translated by 
Batya Stein (Supplements to The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, 
vol. 19), Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2012. 
39  JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, “םשמ םתשקיבו”, in: JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK,  שיא
 הכלהה- רתסנו יולג , Jerusalem 1979 [English version: Halakhic Man, translated by 
Lawrence Kaplan, Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1983]. 
40  The fact that almost all of Soloveitchik’s philosophical writings are rewritten 
and edited versions of lessons and oral lectures has resulted in major arguments 
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It sometimes seems as if the majority of Soloveitchik’s analysis actually 
pertains to the subject of paternity, meaning the spiritual parenthood to 
which he draws attention. Still, the point of departure of Soloveitchik’s ex-
istential observation lies in what he refers to as “natural parenthood” – or 
what this article refers to as pregnancy and maternity. 
Rabbi Soloveitchik, who seeks to give spiritual meaning to parenthood 
using the concept of “redeemed parenthood,” does so by imparting exis-
tential and religious significance to the concept of natural parenthood. What 
makes parenthood meaningful from an ethical perspective is the way in 
which human consciousness understands and gives meaning to biological 
parenthood, which, for the most part, is “maternity.” 
                                                 
between scholars regarding how his writings should be understood, the rela-
tionship between different texts, and how to relate to different phases of his 
development. We can follow the different arguments regarding Soloveitchik’s 
development and the subjects concerning him in the writings of many scholars, 
some of whom who were his students and others who can be viewed as writing 
from the outside. A significant direction of inquiry relates to the philosophical 
sources on which Soloveitchik draws and the philosophical traditions on which 
he relies. I suggest to read Dov Schwartz’s introduction to his From Phenomenol-
ogy to Existentialism (note 38), pp. 4-14, which contains a critical assessment of 
the lack of philosophical precision with which Soloveitchik employs ‘phenom-
enological’ and ‘existential’ concepts. In this article, I refer to the essays col-
lected in his book Family Redeemed (note 19) and refrain from discussing the 
question of developmental context. On the Importance of this dispute and the 
dispute about R. Soloveitchik’s philosophical traditions see: SIMCHA KRAUSS, 
“Kol Dodi Dofek: Fifty Years Later,” in: Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish 
Thought 39/3 (2006), pp. 38-46; LAWRENCE KAPLAN, “The Multi-Faceted Leg-
acy of the Rav: A Critical Analysis of R. Herschel Schachter’s Nefesh HaRav,” 
in: BDD – Bekhol Derakhekha Daehu: Journal of Torah and Scholarship 7 (1998), 
pp. :51-86; DANIEL RYNHOLD, “The Philosophical Foundations of Solovei-
tchik's Critique of Interfaith Dialogue,” in: Harvard Theological Review 96 (2003), 
pp. 101-119; ALMUTH .SH. BRUCKSTEIN, “Halakhic Epistemology in New-
Kantian Garb: J. B. Soloveitchik’s Philosophical Writings Revisited,” in: Jewish 
Studies Quarterly 5 (1998), pp. 346-368; BERGER, “’Uvikashtem mi-sham’ (note 17), 
pp. 93-118; SHLOMO H. PICK, “The Rav: Biography and Bibliography A Review 
Essay,” in: BDD – Bekhol Derakhekha Daehu: Journal of Torah and Scholarship 
6 (1998), pp. 27-44; SHUBERT SPERO, “Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik and the 
Philosophy of Halakha,” in: Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 
30 (1996), pp. 41-64; JONATHAN SACKS, “Review: Rabbi J.B. Soloveitchik’s 
Early Epistemology: A Review of the Halakhic Mind,” in: Tradition: A Journal of 
Orthodox Jewish Thought 23 (1988), pp. 75-87; AVIEZER RAVITSKY, “Rabbi J. B. 
Soloveitchik on Human Knowledge Between Maimonidean and Neo-Kantian 
Philosophy,” in: Modern Judaism 6 (1986), pp. 157-188. 
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As noted at the outset of our discussion, Lévinas's consideration of the 
subject of pregnancy provides is with a deeper understanding of R.  Solovei-
tchik's writings on the subject. Discussion of R. Soloveitchik's texts must 
clearly be undertaken with methodological caution, as his philosophical ap-
proach is not one of strict phenomenological inquiry but rather existential or 
experiential description. The questions that interest R. Soloveitchik are drawn 
from the realm of religious inquiry and Jewish existential thought. Although 
he attempts to imbue a biological phenomenon with philosophical ethical 
meaning, the manner in which he approaches the questions deals more with 
Jewish holy and literary sources and Jewish tradition and the manner in which 
tradition gives meaning to becoming parents. Still, there is meaningful prox-
imity between R. Soloveitchik’s philosophical motivation and that of Lévinas’ 
philosophy in assigning ethical meaning to such a natural situation. 
As already noted, R. Soloveitchik's very discussion of intra-couple rela-
tions, sexuality, and pregnancy was surprising for Jewish religious discourse 
in the eyes of many.41 Though his words and his sentiments bear a local 
interpretative character, he nonetheless makes use of homiletical sermons 
and interpretation to offer a modern, contemporary account of questions 
of intra-couple relations and parenthood from a perspective that takes into 
consideration psychoanalytical psychological thought and liberal egalitarian 
thought.  We now turn to a presentation of R. Soloveitchik's discussion 
based on the homiletical interpretations he assigns to the weekly portions 
of the book of Genesis.42 
                                                 
41  BLIDSTEIN, “The Covenant of Marriage” (note 16); DOV SCHWARTZ, “Intra-
Couple Relations (Zugiut) in the Philosophy of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik,” in: 
Da`at 57-59 (2006), pp. 333-353 (Hebrew); HANNAH KEHAT, “Intra-Couple 
Relations (Zugiut) and Equality: Rabbi Kook and Rabbi Soloveitchik,” in: 
Massekhet 4 (2005), pp. 35-48 (Hebrew). 
42  On these philosophical lectures and lessons, see, e.g., JONATHAN COHEN, 
“Strauss, Soloveitchik, and the Genesis Narrative: Conceptions of the Ideal Jew 
as Derived from Philosophical and Theological Readings of the Bible,” in: Jour-
nal of Jewish Thought & Philosophy 5 (1995), pp. 99-143; RAPHAEL YARCHI, “Mid-
rashic, Literary, and Philosophical Aspects of the Creation of Man and its In-
terpretive and Educational Implications,” in: Derekh Efrata 7 (1993/94), pp. 67-
88 (Hebrew); YUVAL CHERLOW, “The Role and Meaning of the Chapters of 
Creation in the Doctrine of Rabbi Soloveitchik,” in: Petuchei Chotem 2 (2005/06), 
pp. 215-251 (Hebrew); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, “Adam and our Selves,” in. 
JONATHAN W. MALINO (ed.), Judaism and Modernity: The Religious Philosophy of 
David Hartman, Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004, pp. 158-170; DAN VO-
GEL, “The Legacy of Two Adams,” in: Jewish Bible Quarterly 33 (2005), pp. 3-12. 
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R. Soloveitchik traces the names given to man and woman, to Adam and 
Eve. The first woman, he points out, is called הוח Hava (Eve), a name de-
rived from the Hebrew root היח meaning “life”, because she was the mother 
of all life, or perhaps the mother of all human life. In the Bible, motherhood 
is the primal aspect of the feminine.43 Man, in contrast, is referred to as םדא 
Adam, a name attesting to a deep relationship with the “earth”, “ground” 
or “land” (in Hebrew, המדא) from which man was taken,44 and neither fa-
therhood nor parenthood emerges as a particularly salient aspect of mascu-
linity in the corpus of Biblical texts. This terminological differentiation is 
crucial for our understanding of the meaning of parenthood in Solovei-
tchik's thinking. For him, there is a difference between the natural aspects 
of the masculine and the feminine, and we can make use of this differenti-
ation to inquire into the meaning of parenthood.45 
R. Soloveitchik teaches us that pregnancy has religious meaning in the 
Jewish tradition. The first woman is named Eve because she is the mother 
of all. Adam, on the other hand, is the first man but is not described as a 
father. The first father is Abraham, as reflected in his name as originally 
written in Hebrew: םרבא Avram, which means “exalted father.” According 
to the biblical narrative, םרבא became םהרבא Avraham, or Abraham, at the 
age of ninety when God added the Hebrew letter ה (h) to his name. But 
what is the meaning of this extra letter?46 R. Soloveitchik suggests that the 
difference between man and father is the difference between “man- natura” 
and “man-persona”. Man-natura is the man who is part of nature, and may 
even include sinners. The archetype of this man is Adam, the first man. 
Abraham, in contrast, is the model of man-persona, who overcomes his own 
nature, directs himself toward spirituality and redemption, and is compelled 
to change along with the change in his purpose. Adam hears the divine 
voice and chooses to remain part of nature, ignoring God’s commandment 
and becoming a sinner. Abraham also begins as part of nature but strives to 
                                                 
43  See SOLOVEITCHIK, Family Redeemed (note 19), pp. 105-106; on the dialogical 
meaning of the relationship ‘female and male’ see JOSEPH DOV SOLOVEITCHIK, 
“The redemption of sexual life,” in: SOLOVEITCHIK, Family Redeemed (note 19), 
pp. 73-104.  
44  On the mythological meanings of this etymology, see RAPHAEL PATAI, המדאו םדא, 
Jerusalem: The Hebrew Press Association, 1941–1942.  
45  SOLOVEITCHIK, “Parenthood: Natural and Redeemed,” in: SOLOVEITCHIK, 
Family Redeemed (note 19), pp. 105-125. 
46  See SOLOVEITCHIK, Family Redeemed (note 19), pp. 117-119. 
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hear the divine voice in search of a commandment. Adam leaves paradise, 
whereas Abraham attempts to rebuild it. 
For R. Soloveitchik, parenthood in natural society is a biological phe-
nomenon associated with the woman as mother and the phenomenon of 
maternity. Addressing the question “who suffers from parenthood?” 
R. Soloveitchik asserts that it is the mother who suffers, and that it is typi-
cally she who assumes responsibility. The father may ignore or even deny 
his parenthood, and may therefore evade his responsibility.47 Maternity as a 
corporeal experience is encountered first in pregnancy. Man cannot recog-
nize his parental responsibility without ethical observation.48 Motherhood 
can be thought of as a situation in which the woman subjects upon herself 
within herself, and in which the emotional status is derived from the cor-
poreal status. To be a father, in contrast, is not a corporeal status but rather 
a logical understanding with ethical obligations. 
For R. Soloveitchik, the ethical meaning of parenthood transcends bio-
logical parenthood. Ethical parenthood is derived from a human conscious-
ness of being before infinity or standing before God, and one must move 
beyond the biological dimension in order to understand the ethics of the 
phenomenon. In this way, ethical parenthood is first fatherhood and only 
then can be considered motherhood: 
New commitments were accepted; man began to live not only for himself, but 
for others as well. He became concerned with the destiny of others, and dis-
covered in himself responsiveness not only to biological pressure but to the call 
of conscience, through which God addresses Himself to him.49 
According to R. Soloveitchik, “redeemed fatherhood” is achieved not by eth-
ical syllogism but by purification from orgiastic, hedonistic experience toward 
conscience and heteronomy. This means that the concept of parenthood is 
redeemed only by standing before divinity. From a logical perspective, then, 
fatherhood is parenthood derived from the role of being a teacher, which we 
might refer to as “teacherhood” (to coin a new word). Man becomes a father 
not out of biological fact but rather by virtue of the act of trying to educate 
his child. In his own name and the name of the law, the father stands before 
his child bearing all the tradition that transcends him. The obligation of fa-
therhood is the consequence of the father’s representation of the community 
                                                 
47  SOLOVEITCHIK, Family Redeemed (note 19), pp. 110-111. 
48  See the way R. Soloveitchik described the duality of fatherhood: SOLOVEI-
TCHIK, Family Redeemed (note 19), pp. 121-122. 
49  SOLOVEITCHIK, Family Redeemed (note 19), p. 107. 
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of the covenant. Maternity is a natural obligation stemming from biological 
circumstance; fatherhood is a duty stemming from personal will. 
From Soloveitchik’s perspective, this understanding also changes the 
meaning of motherhood from a biological state to a willingly accepted duty. 
Sarah emerges as the archetype of this new kind of mother after learning 
from Abraham the ethical meaning of parenthood: being part of the com-
munity. As a mother-teacher, she is more of a spiritual mother than a bio-
logical mother, which is an interpretation with far reaching application. Af-
ter all, whereas the role of the biological mother is limited to the family and 
the tribal circle, the spiritual and teacher-mother bears universal responsi-
bility and is part of a cosmological community. For this reason, just eleven 
verses after describing Abraham as “the father of a multitude of nations” 
(Gen. 17:5), we also learn that Sarah “shall give rise to nations” and that 
“rulers of peoples shall issue from her.” 
This changing meaning of parenthood is constructed on what for 
R. Soloveitchik are basic concepts: fate and destiny. Eve is an instinctive 
mother who exercises responsibility for her child but is nonetheless not a 
leader. It is Sarah who is the model of ethical motherhood based on her 
vision and understanding that community is based more on the covenant 
than on familial relations. By changing her name, the mother changes her 
own meaning and becomes ethically active. 
The Pain and Suffering of Pregnancy 
A fascinating point in the discussion of both R. Soloveitchik and Lévinas 
concerns the difficult, painful, and at times downright agonizing phenome-
non of pregnancy.50 Indeed, consideration of the difficult aspects of preg-
nancy and parenthood causes us to rethink the ethical aspects and implica-
tions of the discussion. In this context, the difference between the two 
thinkers is extremely pronounced. Whereas Lévinas understands pain based 
on concepts of complete responsibility, R.  Soloveitchik understands it in 
terms of “sacrifice.”51 
R. Soloveitchik, it is interesting to note, prefers to explain the redeemed 
act through corporeal description and employs the term “sacrifice”  to 
                                                 
50  See Rashi on Genesis 3:16: “your sorrow: This refers to the pain of child rear-
ing; and your pregnancy: This refers to the pain of pregnancy; in pain you shall 
bear children: This refers to the pain of childbirth.”  
51  See the way that R. Soloveitchik described the “Sacrificial Action”: SOLOVEI-
TCHIK, Family Redeemed (note 19), pp. 110-111. 
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denote that which provides the mother with a way of overcoming biological 
difficulty. This is the sanctity of the body, he posits, achieved by the readi-
ness to sacrifice. After all, even the most natural experience of motherhood 
involves sacrifice and suffering, as the woman loses her right to freedom 
and the ability to manage her life as she desires.52 
The Bible emphasizes this point with its extensive description of the 
natural desire for a child that goes unsatisfied by nature. The pain and sor-
row of women who are not blessed with children is a recurring theme in 
biblical texts. The desire for offspring is a yearning for actualization, but 
also involves sacrifice and suffering. As God explains to Eve in Genesis: 
“I will make most severe your pangs in childbearing. In pain shall you bear 
children. Yet your urge shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over 
you” (Gen. 3:16). Entry into the community of the covenant imbues this 
suffering with meaning and endows it with purpose, transforming it from 
an absurd experience into a sacrifice for the benefit of the eternal idea of 
the community of the covenant.53 
R. Soloveitchik therefore distinguishes between the desire for a child 
stemming from primitive instinct and the desire for a child stemming from 
the need to serve and participate in a society with a messianic destiny. The 
first, instinctive mother derives pleasure from caressing and coddling her 
child, while the second, spiritual-educational mother teaches and educates her 
child. This desire for motherhood returns the mother to the divine covenant 
through a mystical imitatio Dei – the desire to benefit another – and the mother 
is expected to hand over her child to be dedicated to God’s service. 
For Lévinas, however, this phenomenology is only part of the meaning 
of pregnancy, which also involves the transformation of the subjectivity of 
the subject. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Lévinas develops an im-
age and concepts of pregnancy as something that defies all frameworks of 
consciousness, just as we are considering maternity as a physical, bodily ex-
perience. The notion of maternity does away with the possibility of discuss-
ing relations only in an external fashion, as in the case of pregnancy, the 
meaning of the concept is embodied. Here, sensitivity begins not with 
awareness of the other but within the body itself. It involves being pursued 
by a stranger in a very real way but also the paradox of desiring this pursuit 
and even being responsible for it. It is this sigh–which includes pregnancy–
                                                 
52  SOLOVEITCHIK, Family Redeemed (note 19), p. 106. 
53  See SOLOVEITCHIK, Family Redeemed (note 19), pp. 117-123, and his use of the 
term of “Covenantal Community”. 
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that is the result of being pursued by the one who is to be born or has 
already been born. 
From Lévinas’ perspective, maternity is not limited to the phenomenon 
of pregnancy alone but is rather subject to expansion into thinking about re-
lations with an Other that are not preceded by the consciousness of the sub-
ject: “In maternity what signifies is a responsibility for others, to the point of 
substitution for others and suffering both from the effect of persecution itself 
in which the persecutor sinks. Maternity, which is bearing par excellence, 
bears even the responsibility for the persecuting by the persecutor.”54 
The significance of this difference is rooted in the fact that the person-
to-person encounter in pregnancy occurs without pretext or defence and 
with no setting of boundaries between the two beings. Pregnancy demands 
a reconsideration of the entire significance of sensitivity toward the other 
in that it lacks the element of disingenuousness that may accompany other 
encounters. The subject’s leap of consciousness in pregnancy includes the 
pain and suffering of being actively pursued.55 
In addition to this description of a mother’s readiness to suffer and bear 
pain for an Other, Lévinas articulates the principle of Messianism as a read-
iness to endure agony. This notion appears in Lévinas’ writings in the con-
text of an explanation of one of the names assigned to the Messiah in the 
Talmud – a name which, unlike the other names, does not paint a positive 
picture but instead stresses conflict and a willingness to endure suffering 
for another: “And the Rabbis said: ‘The ערוצמ meṣora [one afflicted by lep-
rosy, a disfiguring skin disease] of the House of Rabbi [Judah the Prince]’ is 
his name, as it is stated: ‘Indeed it was our diseases that he bore and our 
pangs that he endured, whereas we considered him plagued, smitten by God 
and afflicted’ (Isa. 53:4(.”56 
The expression “the  ערוצמ of the House of Rabbi” as a name for the 
Messiah removes messianic status from the realm of a particular individual 
and defines it as a distinctive human capability, ascribing messianic attrib-
utes to teaching and to teachers—not those who comfort and encourage 
but those who are about a willingness to suffer. Returning to our discussion 
of maternity, we see how close this notion is to the conception of pregnancy 
as being pursued and suffering for the benefit of the very one who is pur-
suing you. Readiness to suffer for others is a central characteristic of both 
Messianism and teaching. 
                                                 
54  LÉVINAS, Otherwise than Being (note 30), p. 75. 
55  LÉVINAS, Otherwise than Being (note 30), p. 121. 
56  bSanh 90b.  
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It now becomes clear that the description of the teacher as messiah, 
which initially sounds so gratifying, actually sounds amenable only as long 
as we refrain from inquiring into its constituent elements. Once explored at 
a deeper level, however, it emerges as a tough and perhaps even intolerable 
expectation of the teacher, as it necessarily means extricating the student 
from alienation and anonymity in the classroom, in the community, and in 
the world at large. Personal recognition of the student is accomplished 
through gestures of peace, sympathy, and generosity and is not an intellec-
tual event involving the learning of specific “content.” There is no material 
to be imparted, no necessary knowledge or even “truth.” It is something 
that transcends truth, something entirely personal: a “personal name.” As if 
these expectations are not enough, Lévinas expects the teacher to be pre-
pared to “endure,” to suffer on behalf of the student, not only because of 
what he suffers from the world around him but because of what he does to 
the teacher because he is his teacher. 
For Lévinas, exploring the ethical significance of pregnancy helps teach 
us the true meaning of responsibility. Indeed, pregnancy has the potential 
to invert the meaning of ethical commandments, from the imperative de-
rived from the outside–from the face of the other–to the imperative derived 
from within – from the unborn foetus. The externally derived ethical im-
perative is based on the negative commandment “חצרת אל lo tirṣaḥ – Thou 
shall not kill,” whereas the internally derived ethical meaning is based on 
the positive imperative for complete responsibility. 
Both Lévinas and R. Soloveitchik view teaching and education as an in-
ternalization of parental responsibility. R. Soloveitchik makes frequent use 
of this description, as reflected, for example, in his discussion of the above-
mentioned passage from Genesis (25:19) from which we learn that “Abra-
ham begot [דילוה] Isaac.” “Ibn Ezra and also Targum Onqelos give a differ-
ent interpretation,” explains Soloveitchik in one of his sermons. “They say 
that ‘Holid’ is not begot but educated. The first one is biological, the second 
is teacher.  Apparently, Abraham neglected the education of Ishmael. All 
that was given to Abraham was conditional that a father is not only biolog-
ical but that he is a teacher.” In order to broaden the meaning of 
parenthood, Lévinas cites the Talmudic assertion that “Whoever teaches 
someone else's son Torah is considered as if he fathered him.” With this 
manoeuvre, in a manner strikingly similar to R. Soloveitchik, Lévinas pro-
vides a basis for the change in the understanding of parenthood from a 
biological category to an ethical one. 
By relating to the educator-teacher as a biological parent, Lévinas re-
constructs the concept of parenthood with an emphasis on its ethical 
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meaning: responsibility. On the one hand, Lévinas explores the ethics in 
‘face-to-face’ relations as dictated by ethical imperatives received by the 
subject from the outside. On the other hand, he understands the phenom-
enon of pregnancy and maternity as an ethical imperative emanating from 
within.57 The ethical significance of education is an internalization of the 
feminine aspects reflected in pregnancy and maternity. This principal idea 
has a number of ethical implications that ascribe parental duties to an ed-
ucational context. When Lévinas portrays the teacher not as one who im-
parts dry knowledge but one who enables the future, he endows the 
teacher with feminine aspects. In this way, Lévinas also characterizes the 
very values he ascribes to the teacher as messianic as the messianic aspects 
of the feminine: recognition, peace, and the possibility of escaping ano-
nymity.58 
Elsewhere, Lévinas directs the reader’s attention to the connection be-
tween thought about God and pregnancy – that is, between God and the 
womb.59 In rabbinical Hebrew, God is sometimes referred to as אנמחר 
Raḥmana, “the Merciful One,” derived from the Aramaic word for “love,” 
the root letters of which ( ר-ח-ם  r-ḫ-m) are the same as those of םחר reḥem, the 
Hebrew word for “womb.” This divine epithet, then, can be understood as 
deriving from an understanding of God as womb. According to Lévinas: 
“Raḥamim [םימחר] is the relation of the other, whose gestation takes place 
within it. Raḥamim is maternity itself.”60 
The idea of divinity as womb enables us to understand God’s infinite 
nature as openness to different possibilities and to a future created by hu-
man agency. The womb, as the ability to accommodate and open up to the 
Other, is a distinctly feminine phenomenon. According to Lévinas: “God 
as merciful is God defined by maternity. A feminine element is stirred in 
                                                 
57  The transcendental inward direction is discussed in HANOCH BEN PAZI, Call to 
Responsibility, PhD dissertation, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 2002, pp. 283-
291 (Hebrew). 
58  Attention should be paid to the manner in which Lévinas discusses the issue of 
pain and suffering, which steers completely clear of any discourse of theodiza-
tion and is instead formulated in terms of ethics (see his essay “Useless Suffer-
ing”). In the present discussion, attention is paid to the subject of pain not only 
in the context of justified or unjustified suffering but using the ethical categories 
of responsibility and parenthood. 
59  EMMANUEL LÉVINAS, “Damages Due to Fire,” in: EMMANUEL LÉVINAS, Nine 
Talmudic Readings, translated by Annette Aronowicz, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 1990 (²1994), pp. 178-197. 
60  LÉVINAS, “Damages Due to Fire” (note 59), p. 183.  
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the depth of this mercy. This maternal element in divine paternity is very 
remarkable.”61 
Conclusion 
Both Lévinas and R. Soloveitchik display an interest in the phenomenology 
of pregnancy and its ethical significance. The difference in their thinking is 
their methodology. For R. Soloveitchik, pregnancy is a biological phenom-
enon, and the ethical meaning of parenthood stems from the transition into 
religious and spiritual life before the divine. In this way, fatherhood is not a 
biological fact but rather the redemption of natural events and understand-
ing the responsibility of redeemed parenthood hinges on an understanding 
of fatherhood in the context of the destiny of the community. Man becomes 
a father when he understands his role as the child’s teacher. Lévinas’ phe-
nomenology, on the other hand, focuses on the biological fact of pregnancy 
itself as an embodied trope of general ethical responsibility. 
From Soloveitchik’s perspective, somewhat surprisingly, women can 
grasp the spiritual meaning of motherhood by observing and inquiring into 
fatherhood. Indeed, his conclusion regarding the phenomenology of preg-
nancy is that ethics lie beyond nature due to humans’ standing before divin-
ity. For Lévinas, the phenomenology of pregnancy holds broader, more 
fundamental implications for general interpersonal relations and can be un-
derstood as embodying the meaning of complete responsibility toward the 
other, which continues into maternity and parenthood (with the deep mean-
ing of education being based on the significance of parenthood). 
This differentiation is not merely a difference of structure but a question 
of precedence. Whereas for Lévinas ethics facilitates the advance of con-
sciousness and infinity precedes humanity, ethics for R. Soloveitchik is the 
realization of human consciousness, which is to say that humanity precedes 
infinity. The meaning of infinity here is also different, as for Lévinas the 
phenomenology of pregnancy is also a reminder of the unmemorable, the 
advance of the Other, and otherness. In this way, the corporeal situation is 
a representation of the infinity of the Other and of alterity. 
                                                 
61  LÉVINAS, “Damages Due to Fire” (note 59), p. 183. 
